Hájek and Montagna proved that the modal propositional logic ILM is the logic of Π1-conservativity over sound theories containing IΣ1 (P A with induction restricted to Σ1 formulas). I give a simpler proof of the same fact.
Introduction
By a "theory" we mean an effectively axiomatized theory whose language contains that of P A (arithmetic).
A theory T 2 is said to be Π 1 -conservative over a theory T 1 , if T 1 proves every Π 1 -theorem of T 2 . And T 2 is interpretable in T 1 if, intuitively, the language of T 2 can be translated into the language of T 1 in such a way that T 1 proves the translation of every theorem of T 2 .
A theory is said to be essentially reflexive, if for any formula α it proves P r P C ( α ) → α, where α is the code (Gödel number) of α and P r P C (x) is the standard formalization of "x is the code of a formula provable in the classical predicate calculus".
It is known that P A is essentially reflexive, but no finitely axiomatizable reasonable theory, including IΣ 1 (P A with induction restricted to Σ 1 formulas), can be such. Indeed, suppose T is a sufficiently strong finitely axiomatized theory. Let then Ax be the conjunction of the universal quantifiers closures of its axioms. If T is essentially reflexive, then T P r P C ( ¬Ax ) → ¬Ax, whence T ¬P r P C ( ¬Ax ), which means that T proves its own consistency and hence, by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, T is inconsistent.
According to a nice fact known as Orey-Hájek characterization, if given theories are essentially reflexive, one is interpretable in another if and only if one is Π 1 -conservative over the other; moreover, this fact is provable in P A, so we can say that interpretability and Π 1 -conservativity relations between essentially reflexive theories are "the same". However, this is not true for finitely axiomatized theories like IΣ 1 .
De Jongh and Veltman [5] introduced the propositional modal logic ILM , whose language contains two modal operators: ✷ (unary) and ✄ (binary). Berarducci [1] and Shavrukov [7] , independently, proved that ILM is the logic of interpretability over P A, that is, ILM yields exactly the schemata of P Aprovable formulas, when ✷A is understood as a formalization of "A is P Aprovable" and A ✄ B as a formalization of "P A + B is interpretable in P A + A". By the Orey-Hájek characterization, this result immediately implies that ILM is the logic of Π 1 -conservativity over P A as well. However, the question whether ILM is the logic of Π 1 -conservativity over IΣ 1 (whose logic of interpretability was in [10] shown to be different from ILM ) remained open until Hájek and Montagna [6] found a positive answer.
In this paper I present an alternative proof of completeness of ILM as the logic of Π 1 -conservativity over IΣ 1 and its sound extensions; this proof is more direct 1 and therefore considerably simpler than that of Hájek and Montagna; since, in view of the Orey-Hájek characterization this result immediately implies completeness of ILM as the logic of interpretability over P A, this is at the same time a new proof of the above-mentioned Berarducci-Shavrukov theorem, which seems the simplest among those known so far.
Modal logic preliminaries
ILM is given as the classical propositional logic plus the rule of necessitation A ⇒ ✷A and the following axiom schemata (✸ = ¬✷¬):
Thus, ILM contains the provability logic GL and, therefore, ILM ✷A → ✷✷A (see [2] ).
One can show that ILM ✷A ↔ (¬A) ✄ ⊥, which means that ✷ can be eliminated from the language of ILM .
A finite Veltman frame is a system W, R, {S w } w∈W , where W is a finite nonempty set (of "worlds") and R and each S w are binary relations on W such that the following holds: 
Arithmetic preliminaries
We fix a theory T containing IΣ 1 . For safety we assume that T is in the language of arithmetic and T is sound, i.e. all its axioms are true (in the standard model of arithmetic).
2
A realization is a function * which assigns an arithmetical sentence p * to each propositional letter p of the modal language and which is extended to other modal formulas in the following way:
• * commutes with the Boolean connectives:
where P r( A * ) and Conserv( A * , B * ) are natural formalizations of "A * is T -provable" and "T + B * is Π 1 -conservative over T + A * ". We need to introduce some more notation and terminology. We will write x F to say that x is the code of some T -proof of the formula F .
"Σ 1 !" denotes the class of the arithmetical formulas which have an explicit Σ 1 form, i.e. ∃xF for some primitive recursive formula F . And simply "Σ 1 " denotes the class of the formulas which are T -provably equivalent to some Σ 1 !-formula. Similarly for Π 1 .
Let us fix ∃yRegwitness(x, y) as a natural Σ 1 !-formalization of the predicate "x is the code of a true Σ 1 !-sentence", such that (T proves that) for each
Existence of the formula Regwitness(x, y) is the only not very trivial, -but quite well known (see, e.g., [8] ), -fact about Σ 1 -(Π 1 -) sentences that will be used in the arithmetical completeness proof below. Now, we say that a natural number k is a regular counterwitness for a Π 1 !-sentence ∀xF , if Regwitness( ∃x¬F ,k) is true.
The completeness theorem

Theorem 2 ILM A iff for any realization
The rest of the paper is a proof of this theorem. It has a lot of similarity with proofs given in [3] , [4] , [11] . Just as in [3] and [4] , I define here a Solovay function in terms of regular witnesses rather than provability in finite subtheories (as this is done in [1] , [7] , [11] ). Disregarding this difference, my Solovay function is almost the same as the one given in [11] , for both works, unlike [1] or [7] , employ finite Veltman models rather than infinite Visser models.
The (=⇒) part can be checked by a routine induction on ILM -proofs, and we are going to prove here only the (⇐=) part.
Suppose ILM A. Then, by Theorem 1, there is a finite Veltman model W, R, {S w } w∈W , |= in which A is not valid. We may assume that W = {1, . . . , l}, 1 is the root of the model in the sense that 1Rw for all 1 = w ∈ W , and 1 |= A.
We define a new frame W , R , {S w } w∈W :
Observe that W , R , {S w } w∈W is a finite Veltman frame.
Following the "traditional" way of arithmetical completeness proofs, we are going to embed this frame into T by means of a Solovay [9] style function g : ω → W and sentences Lim w (w ∈ W ) which assert that w is the limit of g. This function will be defined in such a way that the following basic lemma holds:
To deduce the main thesis from this lemma, we define a substitution * by setting for each propositional letter p, p * = {Lim r : r ∈ W, r |= p}.
Lemma 4 For any w ∈ W and any
PROOF by induction on the complexity of B. If B is atomic, then the clause (a) is evident and the clause (b) is also clear in view of 3b. The cases when B is a Boolean combination are straightforward; and since ✷C is ILM -equivalent to (¬C) ✄ ⊥, it is enough to consider only the case when B = C 1 ✄ C 2 .
Assume w ∈ W . Then we can always write wRx and xS w y instead of wR x and xS w y. is Π 1 -conservative over T +C * 1 , it is enough to show that T + {Lim r : r ∈ α 2 } is Π 1 -conservative over T + {Lim r : r ∈ α 1 }. Consider an arbitrary u ∈ α 1 (the case with empty α 1 is trivial, for any theory is conservative over T + ⊥).
Let us then fix an element u of α 1 such that for no v ∈ α 2 do we have uS w v. Argue in T + Lim w . By 3f, T + {Lim r : r ∈ α 2 } is not Π 1 -conservative over T + Lim u . Then neither is it Π 1 -conservative over T + {Lim r : r ∈ α 1 } (which is weaker than T + Lim u ). This means by (*) that T + C * 2 is not Π 1 -conservative over T + C * 1 . Q.E.D. Now we can pass to the desired conclusion: since 1 |= A, Lemma 4 gives T Lim 1 → ¬A * , whence T ¬Lim 1 =⇒ T A * . But we have T ¬Lim 1 because this fact is derivable in the sound theory T from the true (according to 3g) sentence Lim 0 .
Our remaining duty now is to define the function g and prove Lemma 3. The recursion theorem enables us to define this function simultaneously with the sentences Lim w (for each w ∈ W ), which, as we have mentioned already, assert that w is the limit of g, and formulas ∆ wu (y) (for each pair (w, u) with wR u), which we define by
Definition 5 (of the function g)
We define g(0) = 0. Assume now g(y) has been defined for every y ≤ x, and let g(x) = w. Then g(x + 1) is defined as follows:
1. Suppose wR u, n ≤ x and for all z with n ≤ z ≤ x we have g(z) = w. Then, if x Lim u → ¬∆ wu (n), we define g(x + 1) = u. Then we define g(x + 1) = u.
In all the remaining cases g(x + 1) = g(x).
It is not hard to see that g is primitive recursive. Before we start proving Lemma 3, let us agree on some jargon and prove two auxiliary lemmas.
When the transfer from w = g(x) to u = g(x + 1) is determined by 5.1, we say that at the moment x + 1 the function g makes (or we make) an R -move from the world w to the world u. If this transfer is determined by 5.2, then we say that an S -transfer takes place and call the number m from 5.2 the rank of this S -transfer. Sometimes the S -transfer leads to a new world, but "mostly" it does not, i.e. (u =)g(x + 1) = g(x)(= w), and then it is not a move in the proper sense. Those S -transfers which lead to a new world we call S -moves. As for R -transfers, they (by irreflexivity of R ) always lead to a new world, so we always say "R -move" instead of "R -transfer".
In these terms, the formula ∆ wu (n) asserts that beginning from the moment n (but perhaps also before this moment) and until some moment t, we stay at the world w without any motion and then, at the moment t, we move directly to u.
Intuitively, we make an R -move from w to u, where wR u, in the following situation: since some moment n and up to now we have been staying at the world w, and at the present moment we have reached evidence that T + Lim u thinks that the first (proper) move which happens after passing the moment n (and thus our next move) cannot lead directly to the world u; then, to spite this belief of T + Lim u , we just move to u.
And the conditions for an S -transfer from w to u can be described as follows: We are staying at the world w and by the present moment we have reached evidence that T + Lim u proves a false Π 1 !-sentence F . This evidence consists of two components: 1) a regular counterwitness, which indicates that F is false, and 2) the rank m of the transfer, which indicates that T + Lim u F . Then, as soon as wS g(m) u, the next moment we must be at u (move to u, if u = w, and remain at w, if u = w); if there are several possibilities of this transfer, we choose the one with the least rank. Besides, the necessary condition for an S -transfer is that in the given situation an R -move is impossible.
Lemma 6 (T :) For each natural number m and each w ∈ W , T + Lim w proves that no S -transfer to w can have rank which is less than m.
PROOF. Indeed, "the rank of an S -transfer is < m" means that T + Lim w proves a false (i.e. one with a regular counterwitness) Π 1 !-sentence F and the code of this proof (i.e. of the T -proof of Lim w → F ) is smaller than m. But the number of all Π 1 !-sentences with such short proofs is finite, and as T + Lim w proves each of them, it also proves that none of these sentences has a regular counterwitness (recall our assumptions about the formula Regwitness(x, y) ).
Lemma 7 (T :) If g(x)R w, then for all y ≤ x, g(y)R w.
PROOF. Suppose g(x)R w and y ≤ x. We proceed by induction on n = x − y. If y = x, we are done. Suppose now g(y + 1)R w. If g(y) = g(y + 1), we are done. If not, then at the moment y + 1 the function makes either an R -move or an S -move. In the first case we have g(y)R g(y + 1) and, by transitivity of R , g(y)R w; in the second case we have g(y)S v g(y + 1) for some v, and the desired thesis then follows from the property 5 of Veltman frames.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. In each case below, except (g), we reason in T .
(a): First observe that there is z such that for all z ≥ z, not g(z )R g(z + 1). Indeed, suppose this is not the case. Then, by Lemma 7, for all z there is z with g(z)R g(z ). This means that there is an infinite (or "sufficiently long") chain w 1 R w 2 R . . ., which is impossible because W is finite and R is transitive and irreflexive.
So, let us fix this number z. Then we never make an R -move after the moment z. We claim that S -moves can also take place at most a finite number of times (whence it follows that g has a limit and this limit is, of course, one of the elements of W ).
Indeed, let x be an arbitrary moment after z at which we make an S -move, and let m be the rank of this move. Taking into account reflexivity of the relations S w , a little analysis of the condition 5.2 convinces us that the rank of each next S -move is less than that of the previous one, so S -moves can take place at most m times after passing x. (c): Assume w is the limit of g and wR u. Let n be such that for all x ≥ n, g(x) = w. We need to show that T ¬Lim u . Deny this. Then T Lim u → ¬∆ wu (n) and, since every provable formula has arbitrary long proofs, there is x ≥ n such that x Lim u → ¬∆ wu (n); but then, according to 5.1, we must have g(x + 1) = u, which, as u = w (by irreflexivity of R ), is a contradiction.
(d):
Assume w = 0, w is the limit of g and not wR u. If u = w, then (since w = 0) there is x such that g(x) = v = u and g(x + 1) = u. This means that at the moment x + 1 we make either an Rmove or an S -move. In the first case we have T Lim u → ¬∆ vu (n) for some n for which, as it is easy to see, the Σ 1 !-sentence ∆ vu (n) is true, whence, by Σ 1 !-completeness, T ¬Lim u . And if an S -move is the case, then again T ¬Lim u because T +Lim u proves a false (with a ≤ x regular counterwitness) Π 1 !-sentence.
Suppose now u = w. Let us fix a number z with g(z) = w. Since g is primitive recursive, T proves that g(z) = w. Now argue in T + Lim u : Since u is the limit of g and g(z) = w = u, there is a number x with x ≥ z such that g(x) = u and g(x + 1) = u. Since not (w =)g(z)R u, we have by Lemma 7 that (*)
for each y with z ≤ y ≤ x, not g(y)R u.
In particular, not g(x)R u and the transfer from g(x) to g(x + 1)(= u) can be determined only by 5.2. Then (*) together with the property 3 of Veltman frames and 5.2c, implies that the rank of this S -move is less than z, which, by Lemma 6, is a contradiction. Thus, T + Lim u is inconsistent, i.e. T ¬Lim u .
(e): Assume uS w v = u (the case v = u is trivial). Suppose w is the limit of g, F is a Π 1 -sentence and T z Lim v → F . We may suppose that F ∈ Π 1 ! and that z is sufficiently large, namely, g(z) = w. Fix this z. We need to show that T + Lim u F .
Argue in T + Lim u . Suppose not F . Then there is a regular counterwitness c for F . Let us fix a number x > z, c such that g(x) = g(x + 1) = u (as u is the limit of g, such a number exists). Then, according to 5.2, the only reason for g(x + 1) = u = v can be that we make an S -transfer from u to u and the rank of this transfer is less than z, which, by Lemma 6, is not the case. Conclusion: F (is true).
(f): Assume w is the limit of g, wR u, V ⊆ W and for each v ∈ V , not uS w v. Let n be such that for all z ≥ n, g(z) = w. By primitive recursiveness of g, T proves that g(n) = w. By 5.1, T + Lim u ¬∆ wu (n). So, as ¬∆ wu (n) is a Π 1 -sentence, in order to prove that T + {Lim v : v ∈ V } is not Π 1 -conservative over T + Lim u , it is enough to show that for each v ∈ V , T + Lim v ¬∆ wu (n). Let us fix any v ∈ V . According to our assumption, not uS w v and, by reflexivity of S w , u = v.
Argue in T + Lim v . Suppose, for a contradiction, that ∆ wu (n) holds, i.e. there is t > n such that g(t) = u and for all z with n ≤ z < t, g(z) = w. As v is the limit of g and v = u, there is t > t such that g(t − 1) = v and at the moment t we arrive to v to stay there for ever. Let then x 0 < . . . < x k be all the moments in the interval [t, t ] at which R -or S -moves take place, and
. . , u k is the route of g after departing from w (at the moment t).
Let now j be the least number among 1, . . . , k such that for all j ≤ i ≤ k, not u 0 R u i . Note that such a j does exist because at least j = k satisfies this condition (otherwise, if (u =)u 0 R u k (= v), the property 4 of Veltman frames would imply uS w v).
Note also that for each i with j ≤ i ≤ k, the move to u i cannot be an Rmove. Indeed, otherwise we must have u i−1 R u i , whence, by Lemma 7, u 0 R u i , which is impossible for i ≥ j.
Thus, beginning from the moment x j (inclusive), each move is an S -move. Moreover: for each i with j ≤ i ≤ k, the rank of the S -move to u i is less than x 0 . For otherwise the property 3 of Veltman frames together with Lemma 7 would give by 5.2c that u 0 R u i . On the other hand, since consecutive S -moves decrease the rank (as we noted in the proof of (a) above) and since the rank of the S -move to u k cannot be less than n (Lemma 6), we conclude: for each i with j ≤ i ≤ k, the rank of the S -move to u i is in the interval [n, x 0 − 1]. But the value of g in this interval is w, and by 5.2c this means that u j−1 S w u j S w . . . S w u k . At the same time, we have either u 0 = u j−1 or u 0 R u j−1 . In both cases we then have u 0 S w u j−1 (in the first case by reflexivity of S w and in the second case by the property 4 of Veltman frames), whence, by transitivity of S w , u 0 S w u k , i.e. uS w v, which is a contradiction.
Conclusion: T + Lim v ¬∆ wu (n).
(g): By 3a, as T is sound, one of the Lim w (w ∈ W ) is true. Since for no w do we have wR w, 3d means that each Lim w , except Lim 0 , implies in T its own T -disprovability and therefore is false. Consequently, Lim 0 is true. Q.E.D. This, in turn, completes the proof of Theorem 2.
